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INTRODUCTION
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Senator Joseph Lieberman*
In her most recent book, The Corruptionof American Politics,veteran
Washington observer Elizabeth Drew writes that "indisputably, the
greatest change in Washington over the past 25 years-in its culture, in
the way it does business and the ever-burgeoning amount of business
transactions that go on here-has been in the preoccupation with money.
It has transformed politics and it has subverted values ....
This evaluation, once nursed by a few public interest groups and reformers, now constitutes conventional wisdom. It explains the public's
alienation from the body politic and its disregard for elected officials. It
undermines the good work performed by those in government and the
public spirit with which it is routinely performed. And still, Congress is
incapable of changing how United States federal campaigns are financed.
With the 2000 election cycle well underway, the worst habits of the
past two decades seem to have become the springboard from which new
standards are launched. Candidates are awash in more money than ever
before and party fund-raising records are being shattered routinely. At
least two presidential primary candidates-George W. Bush and Steve
Forbes-have decided to forego public matching funds in order to avoid
the related limits on their campaign spending.2 Meanwhile, other candidates and third party groups are seeking ever more inventive ways to
raise undisclosed and unlimited funds to communicate with voters and
influence elections.3
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) received his bachelor's degree from Yale College
in 1964 and his law degree from Yale Law School in 1967. He is presently serving his second term in the United States Senate, where he is the Ranking Democratic Member of the
Governmental Affairs Committee, and a member of the Armed Services, Environment
and Public Works, and the Small Business Committees. Since 1995, he has been Chairman
of the Democratic Leadership Council.
1.

ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS

61-62 (1999).

2. See Don Van Nalta, Jr., Bush ForgoesFederal Funds and Has No Spending Limit,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1999, at Al.
3. See Susan B. Glasser & Juliet Eilperin, A New Conduitfor "Soft Money," WASH.
POST, May 16, 1999, at Al; Jim Van deHei & Damon Chappie, Veiled Groups Draw Scrutiny: GOP to Benefit from Unlimited Fundraising,ROLL CALL, Sept. 20, 1999, at 1.
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As a member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, I had
hoped the system had reached its nadir in the 1996 federal election campaign, which the committee investigated for most of 1997. I was too optimistic. Because of Congress' failure to enact campaign finance reform,
the system continues to fester to a point where Arizona Senator John
McCain calls it "nothing less than an elaborate influence peddling
scheme in which both parties conspire to stay in office by selling the
country to the highest bidder., 4 Once again, we are witnessing the calculated efforts of both sides to evade, avoid, and subvert the laws regulating who can give how much to whom.
The complete story of the 2000 presidential race will eventually be
told. Until then, the investigation conducted by the Governmental Affairs Committee is the best anatomy there is of how corrupt our elections
have become. What that investigation revealed was the unsettling fact
that in 1996, the major parties sabotaged some of the most fundamental
values underpinning our American experiment in self-rule. And they
gave people good reason to doubt whether they had a true and equal
voice in their own government.
I have always believed the most serious transgressions of the 1996
presidential campaign were entirely legal. Hundreds of thousands of
dollars in soft money contributions from wealthy donors blatantly skirted
legal limits on individual contributions. Unions and corporations donated millions to both Republican and Democratic Parties, despite decades-old prohibitions on union and corporate involvement in federal
campaigns. Tax-exempt groups paid for millions of dollars of television
ads that clearly endorsed or attacked particular candidates although the
law barred the groups from engaging in such extensive partisan electoral
activity. Each of these acts compromised the integrity of our elections
and our government. Each of these acts violated the spirit of our laws.
And each is practiced with equal fervor to this day.
To achieve significant reform of the Federal Election Campaign Act5
(FECA), we simply must reduce the unrelenting pressure to raise vast
sums of money. A ban on soft money contributions is the necessary beginning to that process and the McCain-Feingold proposal6 is the vehicle
through which this goal, one day, will be accomplished. The record created by the Governmental Affairs Committee's hearings in 1997 helped
4. Senator John McCain, Campaign Finance Reform, Speech at Bedford, N.H.
(June 30, 1999), available at <http://www.mccain2000.com> (hyperlink "Press Shop,"
"Speeches," "Campaign Finance Reform").
5. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
6. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1999, S. 1593, 106th Cong. (1999).
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that bill obtain the votes of a majority of the Senate in the 105th and
106th Congress, but an anti-reform minority filibustered the bill and prevented it from passing both times. The House has twice approved the
companion Shays-Meehan proposal. We know the lengths to which the
parties felt they needed to go to raise money during the 1996 campaigns.
Moreover, we know that in the first six months of the 2000 election cycle,
both parties far outpaced their previous records. Compared to the first
six months of the last presidential election cycle in 1995, Democrats and
Republicans separately more than doubled their collection of unlimited
soft money, with Democrats raising $26.4 million in 1999 while Republicans raised $30.9 million.7 This continued exponential growth rate-like
an out-of-control virus-puts us all on notice for what is to come in the
future if we do not put a lid on soft-money contributions.
In the best of all possible worlds, a soft money ban should be accompanied by stricter controls on election advocacy by third party groups.
FECA limits both the amounts and the sources of funds that may be contributed to candidates and political parties in connection with federal
elections, prohibiting, for example, contributions from corporations, labor unions, or foreign nationals who are not lawful permanent residents
of the United States.8 FECA also imposes strict reporting and disclosure
requirements on political committees involved in federal elections, requiring them to provide the public with a detailed accounting of the contributions they receive and the expenditures they make.9 The purpose of
these laws is, among other things, to ensure honest elections by limiting
the sources of campaign funds, and to ensure the public is informed of
both the identity of those trying to influence its votes and the financial
activities of the political parties.
The tax code, for its part, circumscribes the type of political activities
in which organizations with tax-exempt status may engage. Groups with
Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) status-which confers not only taxexempt status, but also the added ability to receive tax-deductible contributions-may not intervene in any political campaign on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate." The -tax code permits organizations with
§ 501(c)(4) status-that qualify for tax-exempt status, but may not receive tax-deductible contributions-to engage in election advocacy as

7. See Federal Election Comm'n Press Release, FEC Releases Fundraising Figures
of Major Political Parties-Large Gain in "Soft Money" Contributions (Sept. 22, 1999),
available at <http.//www.fec.gov/press/ptymy99.htm>.
8. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b, 441e (1994).
9. See id. at § 434.

10. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
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long as such efforts do not make up the group's primary activity. Tax law
restrictions limit these organizations' ability to engage in election advocacy." In addition, the tax code does not permit contributions to political
parties or candidates to be tax deductible.
These provisions reflect Congress' judgment that although taxpayers
should subsidize the activities of groups working in the public interest by
granting them favored tax status, that subsidy should not extend to organizations that focus primarily on political campaign work, unless those
organizations are willing to comply with the regulation of the election
laws. 2 Unfortunately, the scope of the activities some of these groups
engaged in during the 1996 elections went far beyond what Congress intended, and both the tax-exempts themselves and the political parties
used these organizations in ways that the election laws and the tax code
were enacted to prevent.
The abuse continues as aggressive political advocates find new wrinkles in the law to exploit. An increasingly popular method of circumventing federal election laws centers on § 527 of the tax code, 3 which exists precisely to provide tax exemption to organizations primarily
involved in political activities-the party or candidate committees, for
example. Section 527 has traditionally been understood to apply only to
those organizations that registered as political committees under, and
complied with, FECA, unless they focused exclusively on state and local
political activities. Yet, after two IRS rulings recognized an organization's right to claim § 527 status in order to sponsor nationwide issue ad
and voter guide campaigns explicitly aimed at influencing federal elections, 4 the number of organizations switching to, or forming under, § 527
has blossomed. At the same time, these organizations claim their activities are free from FECA reporting requirements because they are not
engaging in "express advocacy" of particular candidates. So, they are
posing as "political organizations" under § 527, but not "political committees" under FECA, even though the definitions of the two-as they

11. See id. § 501(c)(4); Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. Although the tax code permits organizations with § 501(c)(4) status to engage in candidate advocacy, provisions in
FECA, such as the prohibition against corporations engaging in express candidate advocacy, generally restrict their ability to do so.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 527 grants exemption from certain taxes to political organizations engaged in attempting to influence federal, state, or local elections. Organizations involved
in federal election activity that qualify for this status usually recognize that these activities
also bring them under the purview of FECA's requirements.
13. 26 U.S.C. § 527 (1994).
14. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9725036 (Mar. 24, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9652026 (Oct. 1, 1996);
see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199925051 (Mar. 29, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9808037 (Nov. 21, 1997).
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pertain to federal activity-are essentially identical. 5
Those of us who have been lobbying for campaign finance reform over
the years realize it is a long-term commitment. We know success will not
come without a sea change either in the attitude of elected officials or the
public. And we harbor few hopes of reforming the campaign finance system in years, when campaigns are under way. Nevertheless, there are
flaws in our campaign finance laws-oversights, really-that would require
minimal effort to repair. Although the Justice Department has brought
prosecutions dealing with many of the illegal activities of 1996, the criminal
enforcement provisions of the election laws deny prosecutors the tools
they need to be most effective. Under FECA, for example, there is no
provision permitting felony prosecutions. Prosecutors have had to resort
to other criminal laws with felony provisions-like conspiracy to defraud,
or make false statements to the government-which are frequently inadequate. Likewise, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has no guidelines specifically tailored to violations of the campaign finance laws. Again, the absence of specific guidelines forces federal judges to turn to guidelines for
other offenses, most frequently fraud. Perhaps if the criminal law had
been more exacting, 1996 campaign finance scandal figures Charlie Trie
and John Huang might have served jail time for their felony convictions
rather than receiving sentences that enabled them to remain free.
Straightforward remedies such as these would add muscle to the law and
confer proper punishment on campaign finance violators.
The truth is that we cannot ever fully write into law what every citizen
has a right to expect from his or her representatives-that those seeking to
write the rules for the nation will respect them, rather than search high and
low for ways to evade their requirements and eviscerate their intent, and
that those who have sworn to abide by the Constitution will honor the
trust and responsibilities the Constitution places in their hands, rather than
cater to the special interests depositing soft money in their pockets.
We can reduce, however, the feverish and incessant chase for moneythe chase that has pushed candidates and their parties to duck, dodge, and
ultimately debase the laws we have now. The pressure to raise ever expanding sums of cash will continue to drive good people to do bad things, almost
regardless of what the law calls for, if we do not comprehensively recast the
system to defuse the fund-raising arms race permanently and stem the corrosive influence of big money. That is the challenge ahead of us.
15. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1) (defining "political organization" for purposes of
the Internal Revenue Code), with 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (defining "political committee" for
purposes of FECA). For a recent report on the "loophole" created by § 527 in today's political financing system, see Van deHei & Chappie, supranote 3.
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